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I. INTRODUCTION
The emissions of large sea-going vessels contribute significantly to
carbon monoxide (CO), ozone, and particulate matter (PM) concentrations
by generating significant nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions' in many ports
and coastal areas of the United States, 2 including San Diego, Los Angeles,
San Francisco3 and Houston4 . In the United States, such pollution has
hampered efforts to attain the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for these pollutants, especially in California.5 A similar
problem has been noted in Europe where the sulfur dioxide (SOx)
emissions from marine vessels are causing a serious acid rain problem.
6
I. NOx emissions contribute to ozone and PM concentrations as a result of
complex chemical reactions. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From New CI Marine
Engines At or Above 37 kW, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,508, 68,510-68511 (proposed Dec. 11,
1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 94).
2. Nationally, the EPA estimates that NOx emissions from marine diesel engines
make up 8.1% of all mobile source NOx emissions and 4.8% of total NOx emissions,
including stationary sources. Id. at 68,511. The EPA also estimates that Marine diesel
PM emissions make up 4.4% of mobile source PM emissions and 1% of total PM
emissions. Id. These emissions are of course concentrated in coastal areas and port
cities, making such emissions a much more serious problem. Id.
3. The contributions of marine engines in San Diego and San Francisco are
especially high. The EPA estimates that marine engines contribute 17% and 12%
respectively of the total NOx concentrations in the area. Id. at 68,548 n.48. Based on
the EPA's statistics, it appears that large ocean going vessels are responsible for at least
one-half to two-thirds of these contributions. See id. at 68,524 n.48 (noting that small
and medium sized vessels contribute 6% and 5% of the NOx emission inventory in San
Diego and San Francisco, respectively).
4. A study by the Port of Houston estimated that marine engines in the area
produced a total of 31.46 tons per day (tpd) of NOx: 3.28 tpd contributed by port vessels,
7.97 tpd contributed by tug boats and 26.83 tpd from ocean going vessels. Texas
National Resource Conservation Commission: Houston-Galveston State Implementation
Plan Appendices, Appendix C, Houston-Galveston Area Vessel Emissions Inventory 9
[hereinafter Port of Houston Study], at http://www.tnrcc.state.txus/updated/oprd/rule-lip/
sip-appxs.html (last visited March 15, 2002). Based on these numbers large ocean-
going vessels which call on the Port of Houston are responsible for 80% of NOx marine
emissions. See id.
5. Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans; California-South
Coast, 64 Fed. Reg.30,276, 30,278 (proposed June 7, 1999) (to be codified as 40 C.F.R.
pt. 52). For example, in California, "marine vessels account for approximately 40% of
all SO subX [sulfur dioxide] emissions and 12% of all NO subX emissions from both
mobile and stationary sources statewide." Approval and Promulgation of State and
Federal Implementation Plans; California-Sacramento and Ventura Ozone; South Coast
Ozone and Carbon Monoxide; Sacramento Ozone Area Reclassification, 59 FR 23,264,
23,377 (proposed May 5, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 & 81).
6. See Study on the Economic, Legal, Environmental and Practical Implications
of a European Union System to Reduce Ship Emissions of S02 and NOx (Aug. 2000)
[hereinafter European Union Study], at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco
taxation/ship-emissions/mainfinal.pdf. In 1990, marine emissions in the waterways
around Europe were about 10% of total SOx emissions in Europe. Id. at II. Assuming
that reductions continue in other sectors at the current pace, the contribution of marine
emissions is projected to rise to 30% by 2010. Id. According to the study, a source this
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A significant share of these emissions is generated by large sea-going
vessels engaged in international trade, especially foreign vessels.
Section 213 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate these large ships.8 However, the
EPA has deferred reulation of these ships to the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), which has drafted a treaty on the subject, namely
Annex VI of the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (Annex VI).10 The emissions of these large vessels are still
unregulated because the treaty has yet to enter into force."'
Environmental groups have sued the EPA claiming that, by deferring
to the IMO, the EPA has violated its statutory obligations under Section
213.13 The EPA settled the suit by agreeing to regulate large vessels
significant "needs careful attention" because, as other studies have noted, even the most
ambitious emissions reduction program, excluding the control of marine emissions,
would fail to reduce acidification from acid rain below harmful levels in at least 4% of
Europe's ecosystem. Id. at 4.
7. In Houston, for example, 89% percent of all ocean-going vessels, which call
on the port, sail under foreign flags. Port of Houston Study, supra note 4, at 19.
8. Clean Air Act § 213,42 U.S.C. § 7547 (1994).
9. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From New Marine Compression-
Ignition Engines At or Above 37 kW, 64 Fed. Reg. 73,300, 73,306 (1999) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 89, 92, and 94).
10. PROTOCOL OF 1997 TO AMEND MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX VI OF MARPOL 73/78
REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS (International
Maritime Organization ed., 1998) [hereinafter Annex VI].
1i. See id. at Art. 6. Annex VI will enter into force one year after fifteen member
states of the IMO "representing not less than fifty percent of the gross tonnage of the
world's merchant shipping fleet" ratify it. Id. As of March 1, 2002, Annex VI has been
ratified by Norway, Sweden, Singapore, and the Bahamas. International Maritime
Organization, Legal, Status of Conventions-Complete List, at http://www.imo.org/
includes/blastDataOnly.asp/dataid%3D4781/status.xls (last visited March 15, 2002);
Hugh O'Mahony, Bahamas is Fourth IMO State to Ratify Pollution Rules, LLOYD'S LIST
INTERNATIONAL, November 23, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29609756; Donald
Urquhart, Singapore Signs International Accord for Clean Air at Sea, BUSINESS TIMES
(SINGAPORE), August 15, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25564678. These four nations
comprise 14.05% of the world's fleet tonnage. International Maritime Organization,
Legal, Status of Conventions-Summary, at http://www.imo.org/ HOME.html (last
visited March 15, 2002).
12. The Bluewater Network, a San Francisco-based environmentalist advocacy
group, brought the suit in the D.C. Federal Circuit Court. Jack Peckham, Environmental
Groups Charge EPA fails to Prevent Big Ship Diesel Emissions, DIESEL FUEL NEWS,
August 14, 2000, available at 2000 WL 9104837; Russell Long, Opinion: Trading Air
Quality for Global Trade, S. D. UNION TRIB., August 23, 2000, at B9:7.
13. The EPA's deferral to the IMO can be challenged as a violation of the CAA
because Annex VI very likely may never be ratified. Assuming that the treaty goes into
force, however, the deferral can also be challenged on the grounds that the regulatory
requirements of the convention fall short of the CAA requirement that these standards
flying the United States flag, if Annex VI is not ratified by April 30,
2002.14 Theq also agreed to consider regulating large vessels flying
foreign flags. 5
This comment will argue that the EPA may regulate the emissions of
large sea-going vessels flying foreign flags that enter the territorial sea,
contiguous zone, or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the United
States, under Section 213 of the CAA, notwithstanding conventional and
customary Law of the Sea and other international treaties governing
vessel source pollution. Part II of the comment presents background
material that explains the provisions of the CAA, which mandate the
EPA to regulate international shipping vessels. This section also
presents the regulatory schemes developed by the IMO and the EPA.
Part HI evaluates whether the EPA can interpret the CAA to mandate the
EPA to regulate the emissions of foreign vessels in United States'
waters. Subpart A examines whether such an interpretation would be
consistent with the United States obligations under international law.
Subpart B considers how the United States courts would review an
application of the CAA to foreign ships. Of particular importance will
be the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the internal affairs rule and the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Part IV compares the results of
the present analysis with the conclusions of the European report that
analyzes whether the European Community can adopt similar
regulations to reduce SOX emissions in the waterways around Europe.
Part V presents some concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. EPA Mandates to Regulate Emissions
Under Section 213
Under the 1990 Amendments to the CAA, Congress mandated the
EPA to regulate the emissions of marine vessels. 16 Marine vessels are
not mentioned explicitly in the Act. Rather, the statute refers to them
generally as non-road engines or vehicles. 17 The statute requires the
"achieve the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of
technology which the Administrator determines will be available." 42 U.S.C. §
7547(a)(3) (1994). In other words, Annex VI is not a technology forcing regulation.
14. Earth Island Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Settlement Agreement, at 2 (Oct. 26, 2000), at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/
largesi/setlemnt.pdf.
15. Id.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 7547 (1994).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7550(10)-(11) (1995). According to the Senate Report comments
on Section 210 of the CAA, "[t]he term "non-road engines" includes a wide range of
engine uses and vehlicles [sic]. The term includes, for example, diesel locomotives,
farm and construction equipment, utility engines such as lawn and garden equipment,
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EPA to conduct three steps of analysis prior to regulating any class of
non-road engines. 18 First, the EPA must study the emissions of non-road
sources to determine whether they significantly contribute to "air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare."' Second, on the basis of this study, the EPA must determine
whether non-road emissions significantly contribute to carbon monoxide
and ozone concentrations in more than one non-attainment area for these
pollutants. 20 Finally, the EPA must identify specific classes of non-road
engines, which in its judgment contribute to ozone or CO pollution.2'
The EPA is required to regulate only new sources in these classes.
22
B. Regulatory Scheme Behind Section 213
The EPA has completed the three steps of analysis required by section
21323 and has adopted a regulatory framework for marine engines.2a The
regulations classify marine engines into three categories.25 Category one
vessels include those "typically used as propulsion engines on relative!y
small commercial vessels (fishing vessels, tugboats, crew boats, etc.).",6
Category two vessels include harbor and coastal vessels used in U.S.
waters.2  Category three vessels include propulsion engines on large
marine vessels, forklifts and airports vehicles." S. REP. No. 101-228, at 104 (1989)
(emphasis added).





23. In 1991, the EPA conducted a study of non-road engines and vehicle emissions
pursuant to section 213(a)(1), and in 1994 determined, pursuant to section 213(a)(2), that
non-road engines significantly contribute to CO and ozone emissions in more than one
non-attainment area. Control of Air Pollution: Determination of Significance for
Nonroad Sources and Emission Standards for New Nonroad Compression-Ignition
Engines At or Above 37 Kilowatts, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,306, 31,307 (June 17, 1994) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R pts. 9, 89). In 1998, the EPA determined that marine engines as a
class contribute to CO and ozone pollution. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From
New CI Marine Engines At or Above 37 kW, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,508 (Dec. 11, 1998) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 94).
24. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From New Marine Compression-
Ignition Engines At or Above 37 kW, 64 Fed. Reg. 73,300 (Dec. 29, 1999) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R pts. 89, 92, and 94).
25. Id. at 73,305.
26. Id.
27. Id. Both category one and two engines are often used as auxiliary engines on
larger category three vessels. Id.
vessels engaged in international trade, tankers and container vessels.2 8
Regulations were adopted for category one and two vessels, but no
regulations were adopted for category three vessels.2 9 Rather, the EPA
chose to defer to the IMO's draft regulation, Annex VI, because upon
ratification, the convention is to be retroactive to January 1, 2000.30 The
EPA argued that the retroactivity would be sufficient to motivate ship
builders to voluntarily comply with the IMO standards. 3I As of this
writing, the EPA is planning to release proposed regulations covering
category three ships 32in April 2002 in accord with the Bluewater
settlement agreement.
Under section 213, the EPA must adopt regulations that cover pollutants
that cause or contribute ozone or CO pollution.33 This includes NOx
emissions that, as previously noted, significantly contribute to ozone and
CO concentrations by dint of complex chemical reactions.34 The EPA
may also elect to regulate SOx emissions, as the European Union is
considering, if the EPA determines that such emissions "may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare."35 However, the
EPA has not elected to do so.
C. Regulatory Scheme of MARPOL (73/78) Annex VI
Annex VI to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) regulates new or modified category three
sea-going vessels.36 Assuming that the treaty enters into force, it is not
anticipated to have an impact for twenty or thirty years.37 The regulations
28. Id. at 73,306.
29. Control of Air Pollution from Marine Compression-Ignition Engines-Applicability,
40 C.F.R. § 94.1 (2001).
30. Id.; Annex VI, supra note 10, at Regulation 13(1)(a)(i). Retroactivity applies
only to the NOx regulations. Id. The regulation states that it "shall apply to... each
diesel engine with a power output of more than 130 kW which is installed on a ship
constructed on or after I January 2000." Id.
31. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From New Marine Compression-
Ignition Engines At or Above 37 kW, 64 Fed. Reg. at 73,306.
32. Gary Polakovic, Finally Tackling L.A. 's Worst Air Polluter Harbor, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at B 1.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (1994).
34. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from New CI Marine Engines At or
Above 37 kW, 63 Fed. Reg. at 68,510.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(4) (1994).
36. Annex VI, supra note 10, at Regulation 13(l)(a). Specifically, these engines
are defined as having a power rating of 130kW or greater that corresponds to the EPA's
definition of category 3 engines. Id.
37. See James C. Corbett and Paul Fischbeck, Emissions from Ships, SCIENCE, Oct.
31, 1997, at 824. "With a 1.5% yearly fleet replacement rate, a measurable reduction in
nitrogen emissions will not occur for many years. For [NO.sub.x] controls that reduce
individual ship emissions by thirty to fifty percent, IMO regulations would reduce total
emission by less than one percent per year based on current fleet size." Id.
[VOL. 3: 145, 2002] Regulating Foreign Vessels
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
cover both NOx and SOx emissions. Annex VI regulates NOx pollution by
imposing an emissions cap and allowing ship builders and owners to
comply by adopting any effective means available.38 Annex VI regulates
SOx emissions by imposing a sulfur content limit on vessel fuel.39 Only
the NOx regulations are retroactive. n
III. PERMISSIBLE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. The Standard of Review
This comment will present the legal basis upon which the EPA can
regulate the pollution emissions of foreign vessels that enter United
States water. The key issue is whether Section 213 may be interpreted to
authorize the EPA to regulate the air emissions of foreign ships that
enter the territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone
of the United States. How a court decides the case will turn in large
measure upon the standard of review that the court applies. Generally,
Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. determines the
standard of review that courts apply to an administrative interpretation of
a federal statute.4 1 Chevron adopted a two-pronged test.42 When a statute is
clear, the court will decide whether the agency's interpretation is consistent
with the statute's clear expression.43 If the court finds that the statute is
ambiguous, the court will defer to any reasonable administrative
interpretation of that statute.44 However, when an otherwise reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute is in conflict with international
law, federal courts tend to extend less deference to an agency than they
would under Chevron. Justice Marshall articulates the rule best: "an act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be
construed to... affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by
the law of nations as understood in this country. ' 5
38. Annex VI, supra note 10, at Regulation 13(3)(b).
39. Id. at Regulation 14(1).
40. Id. at Regulations 13 & 14.
41. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 843.
45. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(emphasis added). Cf John M. Rogers, "Intensional Contexts" and the Rule that
Statutes Should be Interpreted as Consistent with International Law, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 637, 638-52 (1998) (presents a good articulation of the historical development of
As a general proposition, Justice Marshall's rule can be restated as a
presumption that Congress does not intend to violate international law
unless it clearly indicates otherwise. This presumption is based on the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to substitute its own policy judgments
for those of Congress on matters of international law where "[t]he possibility
of international discord" and retaliation is high.46 In the Court's view,
only Congress "has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an
important policy decision.' '47 Furthermore, the Court has never questioned
Congress' authority to adopt legislation that clearly contradicts international
law. Therefore, Justice Marshall's presumption can be rebutted by
evidence of a clear expression by Congress, either in the statute itself or
in the legislative history, that it did in fact intend the statute to apply in a
manner contrary to international law.
49
This rule provides courts with more discretion to reject a statutory
interpretation that contravenes international law than is available under
Chevron; however, the court is still limited by the fact that it must
measure the permissibility of an interpretation against international law
"as understood in the United States." This gives agencies a reasonable
amount of leeway to stretch their statutory authority despite ostensible
constraints imposed by international law. The most notable example is
Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States.
50
In Suramerica, several Venezuelan companies challenged an administrative
action by the Commerce Department to impose countervailing duties
against them because the Commerce Department had concluded that
they were receiving subsidies from the Venezuelan government and
dumping their product, aluminum redraw rods (EC rods), in the United
the rule); Jason M. Schupp, The Clay Bill: Testing the Limits of Port State Sovereignty,
18 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 199 (1994) (analyzes how the Court has interpreted various
statutes under this rule over the course of U.S history, including the Jones Act, the
Seamen's Wage Act, the National Prohibition Act, and the National Labor Relations
Act).
46. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, S.A., 372 U.S.
10, 21 (1963).
47. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). In both
McCulloch and Benz, the Court refused to apply the National Labor Relations Act to
foreign ship owners and their foreign crew sailing under a foreign flag because the
statute and its legislative history were devoid of any indication that Congress intended
that it apply in violation of the flag state's sovereignty over the internal affairs of its
vessel. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21-22. In fact, the court found some evidence in the
legislative history indicating that the law was to apply only to American workers and
employers. Id. at 19-20.
48. Benz, 353 U.S. at 701-702; McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 17.
49. See Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) (holding that
the Nineteenth Amendment and the National Prohibition Act apply to foreign ships
passing through the territorial sea of the United States).
50. 966 F.2d 660 (1992).
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States market to the detriment of domestic producers. 51 At issue in the
case was whether Southwire Company (Southwire), a domestic manufacturer
of EC rods, had standing to petition the Commerce Department to
investigate and penalize the Venezuelan companies under federal law.52
A company has standing as long as it petitions "on behalf of' its
industry.5 3  Under the Commerce Department's interpretation of the
phrase "on behalf of," a petitioning company had no burden to prove
that it had the support of the industry.54 The Venezuelans challenged
this interpretation by claiming that it violated the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) . The court rejected this argument essentially on
the ground that Congress had declared elsewhere in the Federal Code
that the adoption of the GATT into United States law was subject to
contrary provisions in the United States Code.56 In other words, the court
relied upon this statute to support the conclusion that, "as understood in
this country," the laws of the GATT are inferior to the laws of the United
States.57 On this basis, the court allowed the Commerce Department to
interpret the countervailing duty and antidumping duty investigation
statutes in contravention of GATT, even though the countervailing and
antidumping duty investigation statutes were not made expressly
contrary to the GATT by Congress. In Suramerica, the court relied upon
an express provision of a federal statute as evidence of how international
law was understood in this country. Arguably, the court could also rely
upon an expression in legislative history or by the president as evidence
of how a provision of international law is "understood in this country."
B. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The primary source of both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction
for port and coastal state action on environmental matters is the United
51. Id. at661-63.
52. Id. at 663.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 662. Under this interpretation, the measure of support would not be
evaluated unless another company in that industry stepped forward with evidence clearly
indicating that the petitioner did not represent the industry. Id.
55. Id. at 667.
56. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (2000)).
57. Other commentators have read Suramerica as a repudiation of Marshall's
presumption rather than a special application of it. See Michael F. Williams, Note,
Charming Betsy, Chevron, and the World Trade Organization: Thoughts on the
Interpretive Effect of International Trade Law, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 677, 693
(2001).
Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982).58 The
treaty entered into force November 16, 1994.59 Although the United
States Senate has not ratified the treaty,6 ° the history of United States
involvement with UNCLOS 1982 supports the view that the majority of
its provisions bind the United States as customary international law.
6 1
When UNCLOS 1982 was first adopted, the United States voted against
it because the United States disapproved of provisions governing deep
seabed mining.62 However, President Reagan insisted that the United
States would observe most of the other provisions of the treaty.63 Since
then, the United States has reserved jurisdiction over its coastal waters to
the fullest extent allowed by the treaty. 64 In 1994, President Clinton
58. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS
1982].
59. As of March 25, 2002, 138 countries have ratified the treaty. Status of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Table, at www.un.org/depts/los/
convention-agreements/conventionagreements.htm (last visited March 23, 2002).
60. Id. The treaty has been tabled in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by
its Chairman, Senator Jesse Helms, who refuses to allow public hearings. See Opinion:
Ratify the Senate Treaty; Senate Should Overcome Helms' Opposition, S. D. UNION
TRIB., August 20, 1998, at B14.
61. Carol Elizabeth Remy, Note, U.S. Territorial Sea Extension: Jurisdiction and
International Environmental Protection, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1208, 1218 (1992-
1993). The United States has acknowledged in a variety of contexts that UNCLOS 1982
binds it as customary international law. For example, the Coast Guard has amended
regulations covering tanker vessels to conform with UNCLOS 1982 because in its view,
"[t]he Convention sets forth the generally recognized principles of international law
concerning the establishment of laws and regulations by a coastal state in its EEZ to
prevent, reduce, and control pollution from vessels." Overfill Devices, 62 Fed. Reg.
48,770, 48,771 (Sept. 17, 1997) (to be codified as 33 C.F.R. Pts. 155 & 156). This idea
has also been recognized in the courts. See U.S. v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10
(1992) (noting that the Brief for United States, p. 25, n.6 states that "[t]he United States
has not ratified [the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], but has
recognized that its baseline provisions reflect customary international law.");
Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 38 F.Supp.2d 168, 175 n.3
(D.Puerto Rico 1999).
62. Remy, supra note 61, at 1216.
63. Id. at 1218.
64. In 1983, President Reagan asserted United States jurisdiction over a 200 mile
EEZ as authorized by UNCLOS 1982. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605
(March 10, 1983), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 1453 (2000). This has been followed by
Congress. 16 U.S.C. § 5102(6) (1994). In 1988, the President extended the territorial sea
of the United States to twelve miles as authorized by UNCLOS 1982. Proclamation No.
5928, 3 C.F.R. 547 (1988), reprinted in 43 U.S.C. 1331 (1995). In 1999, President
Clinton extended the contiguous zone to the full twenty-four miles allowed by UNCLOS
1982. Proclamation No. 7219, 64 F.R. 48701 (Aug. 2, 1999), reprinted in 43 U.S.C. 1331
(Supp. V 1999). There has been some debate regarding whether these proclamations extend the
applicability of federal statutes that regulate the territorial sea and contiguous zone out to
the twelve and twenty-four mile limits. Remy, supra note 61, at 1226 (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 102-843, p. 9-10(1992)). Congress has been slowly updating federal statutes to
implement the expansion in jurisdiction. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C.A. § 761(b) (Supp. 2001),
as amended by Pub.L. 106-181, Title IV, § 404(a), 114 Stat. 131 (2000) (redefining the
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signed and submitted UNCLOS 1982 to the United States Senate for
65
approval. Certainly, the reservation of expanded jurisdiction under
UNCLOS 1982, despite the failure of Congress to ratify it, carries with it
an obligation to respect the limitations attached to the grant of this
jurisdiction.
UNCLOS 1982 divides the waters of a coastal state into four zones
including the internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and
the EEZ. The treaty grants coastal states varying levels of both prescriptive
and enforcement jurisdiction in each zone. Internal waters consist of
ports and all waters on the landward side of a baseline prescribed by the
treaty. 66 Port-state jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce environmental
regulation in these waters is nearly plenary, subject ony to comity. 67
UNCLOS 1982 does nothing to disturb this core concept.
The question at this stage of the analysis is whether applying the CAA
to foreign vessels in these three zones would in fact violate international
law. Reasonable arguments can be made that applying the CAA in the
territorial sea and contiguous zone does not violate the UNCLOS 1982.
On the other hand, the authority for applying the CAA unilaterally in the
EEZ is much weaker, and no commentator has argued that there are
reasonable grounds for doing so.
1. Territorial Sea
The territorial sea extends twelve nautical miles out from a nation's
applicability of the statute for the purpose of assigning airline crash liability from outside
the three mile limit to outside the twelve mile limit); 18 U.S.C. § 2280(e) (2000)
(defining "territorial sea under the section relating to maritime crimes as within twelve
nautical miles of the coast); 16 U.S.C. § 2402(8) (2000) (defining "import" as bringing
something into the twelve mile territorial sea of the United States); 16 U.S.C. § 1437(k)
(2000) (defining the chapter's applicable area to include the territorial sea "as described
in the Presidential Proclamation 5928."). Notably, neither the definition of territorial sea
or contiguous zone within the Clean Water Act has been changed. See 33 U.S.C. 8§
1362(8)-(9), 1402(b) (2000). The statute still defines them in terms of the earlier
Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Id. The term territorial sea does not appear in the
CAA. See 42 U.S.C. 7401 et. seq. (1994).
65. S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39, at III (1994).
66. UNCLOS 1982, arts. 8-11, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 401-02.
67. Daniel Bodansky, Protecting the Marine Environment from Vessel-Source
Pollution: UNCLOS III and Beyond, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 719, 745 n. 128 (1991).
68. Id. at 746-47. A port state may prescribe and enforce national CDEM
regulations that cover foreign vessels which enter its internal waters. Id. at 746-47, 750
n.15 1.
coastal baseline. 69 Article 21(1) of UNCLOS 1982 authorizes states to
prescribe laws that preserve the environment and prevent pollution in the
territorial sea.7° In addition, Article 211(4) of UNCLOS 1982 explicitly
authorizes states to apply such laws to "foreign vessels, including
foreign vessels exercising the right of innocent passage. 71  Finally,
Article 212 of UNCLOS 1982 imposes a duty upon states to adopt laws
and regulations that reduce marine pollution from or through the
atmosphere in the territorial sea.
72
Article 21(2) limits a coastal state's regulatory authority under UNCLOS
1982 by requiring that any regulations that apply to the construction,
design equipment or manning (CDEM) of foreign vessels must "give
effect to generally accepted international rules and standards (GAIRS). 73
Assuming that emissions standards qualify as CDEM standards, applying the
CAA in the territorial sea would violate this limitation because there are
currently no GAIRS pertaining to the pollution emissions of large sea
going vessels to which the CAA can "give effect.9
74
There is some question as to whether an emissions standard qualifies
as a CDEM regulation subject to this limitation. The language of UNCLOS
1982 suggests that discharge standards are not CDEM standards subject
69. UNCLOS 1982, art. 3, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S at 400.
70. Id. at 405.
71. Id. at 484.
72. Id. at 485. The mandate requires states to apply the regulations in its own
airspace, which necessarily implies that the standards are to apply in the waters below
that airspace. This area of course includes at least the territorial sea. See ERIK JAAP
MOLENAAR, COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION OVER VESSEL SOURCE POLLUTION 504
(1998).
73. UNCLOS 1982, supra note 58, art. 21, 2(f). See also MOLENAAR, supra note
72, at 200-01. The Article states in pertinent part:
I. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of... (1) the
preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution thereof;
2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction,
manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to
generally accepted international rules and standards.
Id.
74. Commentators generally consider this term to refer to regulatory standards
adopted under MARPOL 73/78 by the IMO. UNITED NATIONS CONVNETION ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 202 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Posenne, eds.
1993). The IMO has adopted Annex VI to cover marine air pollution, but it is not clear
whether it qualifies as GAIRS because it has yet to be ratified. Molenaar argues that
international conventions become generally accepted when there is widespread and
representative participation in the convention, including states whose interests were
specially affected. MOLENAAR, supra note 72, at 156-57. Under this test, Annex VI does
not seem to rise to the level of "generally accepted" because only four states have
ratified it. See supra note II.
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to Article 21(2)"5 because Article 194(3)(b) of UNCLOS 1982 distinguishes
regulations controlling "intentional and unintentional discharges" from
regulations covering "the design, construction, equipment, operation and
manning of vessels. 76 Such a distinction has a strong rational basis.
Environmental CDEM standards essentially specify how a ship is to be
designed, what kind of equipment it must use, and how it is to be manned in
order to prevent and reduce vessel source pollution.77 Discharge
standards, on the other hand, regulate the "operational discharges" of
ships by specifying "allowable concentrations.... discharge rates or total
quantities per voyage. 'T Discharge standards are not CDEM standards
because discharge standards do not directly regulate the CDEM of a
vessel. Of course, discharge standards will often impact the CDEM of a
vessel incidentally because in order to comply, shipbuilders and owners
will have to make changes in the way they build, design, equip, or man
their vessels. However, they do not tell shipbuilders and owners how to
build, design, equip, man or operate their vessels.
Arguably, other types of regulations, such as emissions standards,
which impact CDEM in the same minor, incidental way, should not be
subject to the GAIRS limitation of Article 21(2). 79 Molenaar articulates
the argument well:
Emissions standards are not specifically referred to in the LOSC [Law of the
Sea Convention] but should for jurisdictional purposes be regarded as similar to
discharge standards due to the nature of their environmental impact ... . Like
discharge standards, emissions standards are directly aimed at regulating the
amount of substance that enters the marine environment.8 0
75. UNCLOS 1982, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 405.
76. UNCLOS 1982, art. 194(3)(b), supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 478. Accord
Bodansky, supra note 67, at 750 (arguing that UNCLOS 1982 allows states to "prescribe
national discharge but not national CDEM standards"). Article 194(3)(b) imposes upon
states a duty to minimize pollution from vessels to the fullest extent possible by adopting
"measures for preventing ... intentional and unintentional discharges, and regulating the
design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of vessels." UNCLOS 1982,
art. 194, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 478 (emphasis added).
77. MOLENAAR, supra note 72, at 23.
78. Id. at 21-22.
79. Id. at 502.
80. Id at 21-22 (emphasis added). Relying upon Molenaar's characterization of
emissions standards, the EU report argues that the EU could adopt fuel sulfur content
regulations meant to reduce SOx emissions because SOx engine emissions are directly
correlated with sulfur fuel content. Appendix 4, Legal Analysis: Prescription,
Enforcement and Observance, of the European Union Study, n 69-72, at A4.21-A4.22
[hereinafter Appendix 4 of the European Union Study], at http://Europa.eu.int/comm/
Article 212 of UNCLOS 1982 provides another basis for exempting
emissions standards from the GAIRS limitation of Article 21(2). As
previously mentioned, Article 212 imposes a duty upon states to adopt
laws and regulations that reduce marine pollution from or through the
atmosphere in the territorial sea.8 These laws and regulations are to take
"into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures., 82  Unlike Article 194 of UNCLOS 1982,
which requires states to minimize pollution from ships by adopting
regulations such as discharge standards or CDEM standards, Article 212
does not enumerate specific types of regulation. Presumably, a state
could adopt an emissions standard or a CDEM standard to fulfill its
duties under Article 212. Any CDEM standard adopted to control air
pollution would obviously be subject to Article 21(2).83 However, to
date no GAIRS have addressed air pollution. Therefore, Article 21(2)
effectively precludes all air pollution CDEM standards.84 For this
reason, if emissions standards could not be distinguished from CDEM
standards, then Article 21(2) would effectively preclude any regulation
that could reduce air pollution. This would be an absurd result because
it would mean that the drafters simultaneously imposed upon states a
duty to regulate while denying them any means of doing so unilaterally.
Thus, a more plausible conclusion is that emissions standards must be
different than CDEM standards.
While the EPA has yet to promulgate air emission regulations applicable to
large sea-going vessels, these regulations will most likely be very similar
to the NOx regulations adopted in Annex VI.85 As is the case with
discharge standards in general, these standards merely specify permissible
emissions levels and on their face do not require vessels to adopt any
environmentlenveco/taxation/shipemissions/app4final.pdf (last visited March 28, 2002).
81. UNCLOS 1982, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 485. Article 212 states that:
1. States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from or through the atmosphere,
applicable to the air space under their sovereignty and to vessels flying their
flag or vessels or aircraft of their registry, taking into account internationally
agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures ....
2. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and
control such pollution.
3. States acting especially through competent international organizations or
diplomatic conference, shall endeavor to establish global and regional rules,




83. UNCLOS 1982, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 405.
84. See id. See also supra note 74.
85. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
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particular method of attaining them.86 In this respect, Annex VI's NOx
air pollution emission standards are similar to discharge standards.
The impact of NOx emissions regulations mandated by the CAA on
CDEM may also be considered minor because they apply only to new
vessels.87 When old vessels must be refurbished to comply with regulations,
the ship owner suffers not only the cost of installing new equipment but
also the forfeiture of capital investment represented by the remaining
useful life of any equipment he must discard. Congress acknowledged
this cost in drafting the double hull regulation under the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990.88 When new sources are regulated there is a one-time
design cost, which the manufacturer can spread out over total sales.
Finally, provided the EPA adopts regulations similar to those of Annex
VI, this could hardly be a significant burden because manufacturers have
already begun to build to those specifications. 89
However, these arguments do have some weaknesses. As a practical
matter, the NOx emissions standards of Annex VI are more like CDEM
standards than discharge standards because the only way to comply with
them is by installing either a specially certified engine or an exhaust
cleaning system.90 The European Union Study rejected the idea of
applying NOx standards to foreign vessels in advance of Annex VI
entering into force for this reason. 9
86. Regulation 13 specifies permissible emissions levels but allows ship owners to
adopt any method that would meet these emissions levels. Annex VI, supra note 10, at
Regulation 13(3)(b)(ii).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (1994). Molenaar argues that CDEM standards
"are inter alia concerned with replacement or modification of diesel engines, exhaust gas
cleaning systems, and shipboard incinerators." MOLENAAR, supra note 72, at 67.
Notably absent from this list are regulations that apply to the manufacture of new
vessels. Evidently commentators do not consider regulations that require ship builders to
install less offensive engines before they sell a vessel to be CDEM regulations.
88. Oil Pollution act of 1990, 46 U.S.C. § 3703a (1994); H.R. Rep. No. 101-653,
at 139 (1990). Ultimately, Congress decided to impose the requirement only on new
vessels. H.R. Rep. No. 101-653, at 139. Old vessels are to be phased out in a manner
that reduces potential impacts upon the oil shipping and ship building industries. Id. at
139-40.
89. See Pollution: Whatever happened to Marpol Annex VI on its way to the
statute books?, LLOYD'S LIST INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 15, 2001 (noting that "[riesponsible
engine manufacturers have more than lived up to the higher of the limits set by Annex
VI").
90. See Annex VI, supra note 10, at Regulation 13(3). The regulation does allow
"other methods," but the engine and exhaust cleaning solutions are specifically
mentioned. Id.
91. European Union Study, supra note 6, at 32.
2. Contiguous Zone
The contiguous zone, addressed by Article 33 of UNCLOS 1982,
extends twenty-four miles from the coastal baseline.92 Within this zone,
a country "may exercise control necessary to prevent infringement of
its... sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial
sea." Some commentators argue that Article 33 does not establish any
authority to enforce environmental regulation in the contiguous zones
because the convention distinguishes environmental regulation from
sanitary regulation in Articles 19 and 21. This argument does not
foreclose the enforcement of all environmental regulation in the
contiguous zone because some environmental laws also qualify as
sanitary laws.95  States may enforce environmental laws in the
contiguous zone that are intended to protect humans from a direct health
96threat. The preamble of the CAA clearly identifies the CAA as
designed to protect humans from direct health threats.97
Commentators also argue that even if some environmental laws
qualify as sanitary laws, they may be enforced only with respect to
violations that may occur within the territorial sea, not the contiguous
zone.98 Essentially, the provision is interpreted to allow coastal states to
stop ships in the contiguous zone before they enter the territorial sea or
to chase them as they leave the territorial sea, on the suspicion that the
ship may or did violate the laws of the coastal state. 99 A broader
interpretation allowing jurisdiction in the contiguous zone is justified.
92. UNCLOS 1982, art. 33, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409.
93. Id.
94. MOLENAAR, supra note 72, at 277. See also Andrew Anderson, National and
International Efforts to Prevent Traumatic Vessel Source Oil Pollution, 30 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 985, 1002 (1976).
95. Sanitary laws are designed primarily to protect public health. Some
environmental laws are passed to neutralize a direct threat to public health, while others
are passed merely to protect the ecosystem from pollution which at most possesses an
attenuated indirect threat to human welfare. Those environmental laws designed to
protect the public from a direct threat are therefore also sanitary laws.
96. See Bodansky, supra note 67, at 755 n.175 (noting that sanitary may at least
encompass "measures to protect human life.... [including] pollution that threatens
human life.").
97. The CAA states that the purpose of the act is "to protect the quality of the
Nation's resources so as to promote the public health." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1995).
The CAA also states that the EPA is to establish national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) "requisite to protect the public health." 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1995).
98. MOLENAAR, supra note 72, at 276; Bodansky, supra note 67, at 755 n. 177
(citing Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 8 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 73, 111-12 (1959) (arguing that "the coastal state does not
have prescriptive jurisdiction in the contiguous zone.")).
99. See MOLENAAR, supra note 72, at 275-76.
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First, Article 33 refers to "the prevention of infringement."'1°° Some
acts committed within the contiguous zone, though harmless in that area,
may nevertheless simultaneously infringe sanitary laws within the
territory of the contiguous nation without ever requiring that the ship
enter that nation's territorial sea. The emission of air pollution is just
this kind of act because such pollution may drift inland and prevent
coastal authorities from maintaining air quality standards mandated by
law. 10 1 In other words, ships need not enter the territorial sea to infringe
upon the air quality laws of the contiguous nation. That a country may
proscribe such acts in the contiguous zone by appropriate regulation,
naturally follows. Of course, even if a ship may not be stopped for
emitting air pollution in the contiguous zone, legal action may at least be
taken because that ship may very likely enter the country's territorial
sea.
Second, the United States and other countries have asserted
prescriptive jurisdiction in the contiguous zone.'0 2  Specifically, the
United States Clean Water Act (CWA) forbids the "discharge of oil or
hazardous substances ... into or upon the waters of the contiguous
zone." 103  Thus, some custom supports the assertion of limited
jurisdiction to prescribe regulations applicable in the contiguous zone.
More importantly, the CWA provision represents an assertion of this
jurisdiction by the United States. As such it provides a strong basis for
concluding that, "as understood in this country," Article 33 authorizes
the grant of prescriptive jurisdiction for discharge standards. Since air
pollution emissions are very similar to these standards, the application of
these emissions standards in the contiguous zone must also be authorized
under the United States interpretation of Article 33.
Any regulation adopted for the contiguous zone must also comply
with Article 21(2) which limits CDEM standards to GAIRS.1°4 Article
21 controls not only regulations applied in the territorial sea, but all
100. UNCLOS 1982, supra note 58, art. 33.
101. It is not much of a stretch to imagine air pollution drifting from twelve to
twenty miles off shore. For example, there have been reports of air pollution drifting
from mainland China to the western region of the United States. Haze from Asia Spreads
Over U.S., S.D. UNION TRIB., April 18, 2001, at A6, available at 2001 WL 6454794.
102. MOLENAAR, supra note 72, at 279-81; Anderson, supra note 88, at 1002. Cf
R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOVE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 117 (1988); Shigeru Oda, The
Concept of the Contiguous Zone, 11 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 131 (1962).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)(A) (1972).
104. See UNCLOS 1982, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 405.
"laws and regulations" which a country may adopt "in conformity with
the provisions of [UNCLOS 1982] and other rules of international
law."'' 0 5 As previously discussed, discharge standards are not subject to
Article 21(2) because UNCLOS 1982 distinguishes them from CDEM
standards.'°6 The discharge standards applied to the contiguous zone by
the United States under the CWA fall within this exception. As
previously noted, whether emissions standards applied under the CAA
would also fall within this exception is unclear.10 7
3. The EEZ
A country may also assert jurisdiction over an EEZ extending as far as
200 nautical miles out from the coastal baseline. 0 8  Coastal state
prescriptive jurisdiction in this zone is more limited. Article 56(b) of
UNCLOS 1982 grants a coastal state jurisdiction "to protect and
preserve the marine environment" in the EEZ, 109 but Article 211(5) of
UNCLOS 1982 precludes a state from unilaterally prescribing and
enforcing environmental regulations unless they are consistent with
GAIRS. 0 On this basis, most commentators conclude that coastal
states have little jurisdiction to unilaterally prescribe national standards
in the EEZ to preserve the environment. IH However, Article 56(a)
grants coastal states "sovereign rights for the purpose of... managing
and conserving the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the
waters superjacent to the seabed."'" 2 The use of the phrase "sovereign
rights" implies that any regulation adopted to conserve the living
resources of the EEZ would not be subject to the GAIRS limitation
imposed by Article 211. This argument follows from the structure of
Article 56.' Article 56(b) grants jurisdiction "as provided for in the
relevant provisions of this convention," which is to say that this
jurisdiction is subject to any limitations imposed elsewhere in the
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
108. UNCLOS 1982, arts. 56 & 57, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 418-19.
109. Id. at418.
110. Id. at 484 (art. 211(5)). A state may also designate part or all of the EEZ as an
area deserving of special environmental protection and on this basis subject all vessels
entering those waters to regulations which do not conform to GAIRS (again subject to
Article 21(2)). Id. at 484-85 (art. 211(6)). Such regulations must be approved by a
"competent international organization," such as the IMO. Id.
111. Bodansky, supra note 67, at 756. See also The European Union Study, supra
note 6, at 15-16; David Dzidzornu, Coastal State Obligations and Powers Respecting
EEZ Environmental Protection Under Part XII of the UNCLOS: A Descriptive Analysis,
8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 283, 301 (1997).
112. UNCLOS 1982, art. 56, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 418.
113. See id.
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convention including the GAIRS limitation of Article 211(5).14 On the
other hand, Article 56(a) grants "sovereign rights" without any
qualification.' 1 5 The omission of qualifying language like that used in
Article 56(b) supports the view that the sovereign rights granted by 56(a)
were in fact meant to be unrestricted. 16  Furthermore, this view is
bolstered by the policies behind the creation of the EEZ. UNCLOS
1982 created the concept of the EEZ to satisfy developing countries that
wanted to obtain greater control over their coastal resources for the
purpose of promoting economic growth.' 1 7 Refusing to allow a coastal
country to prevent vessel source pollution detrimental to these coastal
resources would be inconsistent with the policies of preventing foreign
exploitation and promoting economic growth among developing nations
which lie behind Article 56.
A broad interpretation of Article 212 may also provide a basis for
applying emissions regulations in the EEZ. Article 212(1) requires
states to control pollution of the marine environment from or through
"the air space under their sovereignty."" 1 8 Some authorities interpret the
duties of Article 212(1) to extend no further than the territorial sea." 9
However, other authorities interpret this provision more broadly as
authorizing coastal states to enforce air pollution regulations against
foreign ships in all zones where they have a measure of jurisdiction,




116. There appears to be a conflict between the language of Article 56 and Article
211(6). Article 211(6) states that any regulation "for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution from vessels" must conform to GAIRS. Id. at 484-85 (emphasis
added). In other words, the provision does not distinguish environmental regulation
intended to preserve the environment from regulation meant to conserve fisheries.
Rather, Article 211(6) appears to apply the GAIRS requirement to all regulations meant
to control pollution from vessels regardless of whether the regulations were adopted to
conserve the natural resources of the EEZ. The policies behind Article 56(a) cut against
this interpretation.
117. CHURCHILL & LOVE, supra note 102, at 133-34.
118. UNCLOS 1982, art. 212(1), supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 485.
119. MOLENAAR, supra note 72, at 504. Molenaar notes that some authorities have
suggested that coastal state jurisdiction extends to the EEZ where it can be shown that air
pollution emitted there impacts the airspace over the territorial sea. Id. at 504 n. 14.
120. See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A
COMMENTARY 319 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1991) (arguing that "[t]he
enforcement powers of a State extend to . . . its exclusive economic zone if the pollution
from or through the atmosphere affects the marine environment of that zone.").
Article 212(2) may also be read to authorize regulation in the EEZ.
This provision requires states to take "other measures as may be
necessary to prevent, reduce and control such pollution."' 2'   Regulating
marine air pollution in the EEZ to prevent air pollution from drifting into
the territorial sea could be among the "other measures" which Article
212(2) authorizes. 122
Of course any regulation justified on the basis of Articles 56 or 212
would still be subject to the limitation imposed by Article 21(2), which
requires that any CDEM standards conform to GAIRS. 123 As previously
noted whether emissions standards are CDEM standards subject to this
requirement is uncertain. 1
24
Thus, a coastal state could prescribe and enforce emissions regulations
in the EEZ under Article 56 on the rational that they are necessary to
conserve the fisheries of the EEZ that would otherwise be negatively
impacted. The strength of this argument turns on the extent to which
science is able to establish a link between emissions pollution in the EEZ
and negatively impacted fisheries. Assuming a link can be established,
applying regulations for this purpose would not be any more onerous
than the stringent fishing regulations already enforced by the Coast
Guard in the EEZ. 1 5  Under Section 212, a coastal state could also
prescribe and enforce emissions regulations on the rational that such
emissions impact the coastal marine environment by drifting into the
territorial sea from the EEZ. Again, a scientific linkage would have to
be established to justify emissions regulation in the EEZ on this basis;
however, sufficient research exists to establish such a link in other parts
of the world. 26 Section 328 of the CAA, which regulates the pollution
emissions of outer continental shelf sources, provides precedent for
regulating sources of pollution in the EEZ on this rational. r 7
121. UNCLOS 1982, art. 212(2), supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 485.
122. Seeid.
123. Id. at 405. See also supra note 105 and accompanying text. Article 56(a) does
grant "sovereign rights;" however, it appears that the language of Article 21(2) applies
even to regulations adopted for the EEZ under 56(a). Id. There language in Article
211(5) is not as broad. See UNCLOS 1982, supra note 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 484.
124. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
125. See Andrew J. Turner, The Regulatory Reach of Living Marine Resource
Statutes: A Moving Target in Uncharted Waters, 30 ENvTL. L. REP. 11006, 11008-15
(2000) (summarizing the various United States laws applicable to EEZ fisheries and
enforced by the Coast Guard).
126. See European Union Study, supra note 6, at 4-6 (documenting how the coastal
emissions have impacted the ecosystems of mainland Europe, including the coastal
regions).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (1994). Outer continental sources "include any equipment
activity, or facility which, (i) emits or has the potential to emit any air pollutant, (ii) is
regulated or authorized under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act [43 U.S.C.A. §
1331 et seq.], and (iii) is located on the Outer Continental Shelf. § 7627(4)(C)(i)-(iii).
[VOL. 3: 145, 2002] Regulating Foreign Vessels
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
4. Summary of Potential Violations
Under UNCLOS 1982, the application of the CAA within the
territorial sea, contiguous zone and the EEZ is on reasonably solid
ground. The primary legal impediment is Article 21(2) of UNCLOS
1982, which states that any CDEM standards adopted under the provisions
of UNCLOS must conform to GAIRS. 128 Emissions regulations do not
per se violate Article 21(2); however, the question of whether emissions
standards are CDEM standards subject to Article 21(2) depends upon
how a court would draw the line distinguishing regulations akin to
CDEM standards from those akin to discharge standards. This uncertainty
would be sufficient to raise the issue of whether Justice Marshall's
presumption 129 should be applied to a court's review of any EPA
application of the CAA to the territorial sea, contiguous zone or EEZ.
There is some evidence in the President's commentary to UNCLOS
1982 that, "as understood in this country," the CAA preempts Article
21(2). President Clinton states that the CAA satisfies the obligation
imposed by Article 212 to reduce air pollution in the territorial sea.'
30
This statement is an implicit declaration by the President that the CAA
can be applied in the territorial sea without violating any other provision
of UNCLOS, including Article 21(2). In fact, President Clinton dismisses
Article 21 elsewhere in his commentary by stating "this rule does not
affect the right of the coastal state to establish and enforce its own
requirements for port entry." 131 In Suramerica, the court relied upon the
expression of a federal statute to conclude that United States law preempted
the GATT. 132 On this basis, more than presidential commentary on the
treaty may be needed to persuade a court that the CAA preempts Article
21 in a way that does not raise Justice Marshall's presumption.
The prospect that application of the CAA to foreign vessels in the
territorial sea, contiguous zone and EEZ may violate international law
means that no court would approve of such regulatory action by the EPA
without subjecting it to judicial scrutiny under Justice Marshall's
presumption. 133 First, a court would have to consider whether Congress
128. UNCLOS 1982, supra note 58, at 405.
129. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
130. S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39, at 36 (1994). The President refers to the sections
of the Clean Air Act covering non-road engines. Id.
131. S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39, at 16.
132. Suramerica, 966 F.2d at 667-68.
133. See Murray, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 118. See also supra notes 45-49 and
intended that the laws be applied in a way that would violate Article
21(2).114 The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on the internal affairs
rule will provide useful guidance on resolving this. Second, with respect
to applying the CAA to the contiguous zone and the EEZ, a court would
have to consider whether Congress intended the CAA to apply
extraterritorially. 135  The presumption against extraterritoriality is a
corollary to the general principle that statutes should not be construed to
violate international law.
C. The Internal Affairs Rule
When interpreting a federal statute that concerns the "internal management
and affairs" of a vessel, the Supreme Court has presumed that the statute
does not apply to vessels sailing in the territorial sea of the United States
under a foreign flag because it is "well-established ... [in] international
law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of
a ship.' 36 The Court holdings regarding the internal affairs rule can
provide valuable guidance because Article 21(2) of UNCLOS 1982 is a
specific, though modern, expression of the internal affairs rule.
Traditionally, the internal affairs rule held that no coastal state could
regulate the internal economy of foreign vessels, which entered its territorial
sea.137 This precluded regulation concerning construction, design, equipment
or manning, the very kinds of CDEM regulations that are limited by
Article 21(2). Article 21(2) loosens this restriction by allowing coastal
states to prescribe and enforce CDEM regulations that are generally
accepted international rules and standards, i.e. GAIRS. Assuming that
CAA regulations would be found more akin to CDEM standards than
discharge standards, the CAA would violate Article 21(2) because there
are currently no GAIRS pertaining to air pollution from foreign vessels
to which the CAA can "give effect."' 138 Thus, for the present discussion,
Article 21(2) is the same as the internal affairs rule. The reasoning
behind the cases in which the courts have allowed agencies to apply
federal law to foreign vessels in violation of the internal affairs rule,
applies to the present analysis with equal force.
accompanying text.
134. See Murray, 6 U.S. (I Cranch) at 118.
135. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
136. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 20-21; Benz, 353 U.S. at 143 n.5.
137. E.g. Note, The Effect of United States Labor Legislation on the Flag-of-
Convenience Fleet: Regulation of Shipboard Labor Relations and Remedies Against
Shoreside Picketing, 69 YALE L.J. 498 (1960).
138. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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1. The Case Law
In Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Mellon, the Supreme Court upheld
the administrative determination of the United States Department of
Justice that the National Prohibition Act [NPA] 139 applied to all
merchant ships, both foreign and domestic, sailing in the territorial sea
of the United States. 140 The Court began its analysis by establishing that
the Eighteenth Amendment 41 and the NPA 142 clearly prohibited the
transport of intoxicating liquors in all territory of the United States,
including its ports and territorial sea. 143 An exception was made only for
liquor in transit through the Panama Canal or on the Panama Railroad.'44
Although neither the Eighteenth Amendment nor the statute made an
express reference to foreign vessels, 145 the court reasoned that Congress
must have intended that the NPA apply to foreign vessels because
exempting them from the statute's broad application would significantly
frustrate its enforcement. 146 The Court relied upon the Panama exception as
evidence that Congress wrote the statute aware that it would impact
foreign vessels. 147 Therefore, in light of the broad territorial language of
the statute and Congress' stipulation that it should be construed
liberally, 148 the Court allowed the Justice Department to apply the NPA
139. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1935).
140. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 128-29.
141. Section 1 of the Eighteenth Amendment states: "After one year from the
ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and
all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for the beverage is hereby prohibited." U.S.
Const. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. Const. amend. XXI.
142. The Court cites sections 3, 21, 23, and 26 of the NPA. Section 3 prohibits
anyone from "transport[ing] ... any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this act"
and provides that "the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to the end that
the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented." § 3, 41 Stat. at 308-09.
Sections 21, 23, and 26 make specific reference to boats, water craft, or any conveyance
whatever as a prohibited places of storage, manufacture or bartering or means of
transporting intoxicating liquors. §§ 21, 23, 26, 417 Stat. at 314-15.
143. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 122, 127. In the Court's view, it was commonly
understood that this territory entailed all United States ports and its territorial sea. Id. at
122.
144. Section 20 of Title III states that the act "shall not apply to liquor in transit
through the Panama Canal or on the Panama Railroad." § 20, 41 Stat. at 322.
145. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 126.
146. Id.
147. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 128.
148. NPA, § 3, 41 Stat. at 308-09.
to ships sailing under foreign flags. 149
The holding of Cunard does not rest upon the broad language of the
statute alone. Since Cunard, the Court has held that other statutes with
similarly broad statutory language should not be applied in violation of
the internal affairs rule to foreign vessels. These include cases arising
out of the Jones Act and the Seaman's Wage Act. 150 The only real
difference between Cunard and these other cases is that, in Cunard, not
applying the NPA to foreign ships would have undermined the
enforcement of the NPA while no such concern was raised with respect
to the Jones Act or Seaman's Wage Act.151 Therefore, Cunard stands
for the proposition that the Court will apply a statute to a foreign ship
that enters United States waters when such an application falls within the
broad language of the statute and is critical to the effectiveness of the
legislation.
Wildenhus' Case is another example of the Supreme Court allowing
the United States to exercise jurisdiction over a ship sailing under a
foreign flag in United States waters despite the "internal affairs" rule. 1
52
In Wildenhus, the Court permitted the United States to exercise jurisdiction in
order to investigate and prosecute a murder that had occurred on a
Belgian ship while it was docked in the port of New Jersey because the
matter was a disturbance to the tranquility and public order of the port.'53
Essentially, Wildenhus stands for the proposition that laws meant to
preserve the tranquility of a nation's coastal areas should be enforced
despite the internal affairs rule.
2. CAA and the Internal Affairs Rule
The statutory language and legislative history of the CAA are sufficiently
clear to justify applying its regulations to foreign flagged ships,
notwithstanding the "internal affairs" rule or Article 21(2) of UNCLOS
1982. This application is justified by the same principles that justified
application of the NPA 54 to foreign ships in Cunard. As was the case
149. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 127-28.
150. See Jason M. Schupp, The Clay Bill: Testing the Limits of Port State
Sovereignty, 18 MD. J. IN'LL. & TRADE 199, 216-22 (1994) (analyzes how the Court has
interpreted various statutes in light of international maritime law, including the Jones
Act, the Seamen's Wage Act, the National Prohibition Act, and the National Labor
Relations Act).
151. Id. at 222. Schupp argues that Cunard could stand for the proposition that "a
port state may interfere with the internal economy of a foreign vessel if the shipboard
conduct would embarrass [the domestic law's] enforcement and.., defeat the attainment
of its obvious purpose. Id., quoting Cunard, 262 U.S. at 127.
152. Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1886).
153. Id.
154. NPA, Ch. 84, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1935).
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with the NPA, the CAA is a statute of broad application. The CAA
shoulders the broad purpose of "protect[ing] and enhanc[ing] the quality
of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare and the productive capacity of its population." 155 In pursuit of
this purpose, Congress has progressively expanded the breadth of
pollution sources covered by the CAA over the last thirty-five years.
156
Expanding the scope of regulated sources has enabled Congress to
continue pollution reduction in a cost effective manner. In 1990,
Congress expanded this coverage to non-road engines by passing into
law section 213 of the CAA. 1 7  The legislative history specifically
defined non-road engines and vehicles to include marine vessels.
158
Obviously, the category "marine vessels" includes vessels sailing under
foreign flags. Congress made no attempt to limit this term to domestic
vessels, nor does the statute give the EPA the discretion to make this
exception. The statute requires that the EPA regulate all classes of non-
road engines that it reasonably anticipates will affect the public health. 59
The Senate instructed the Administrator of the EPA to classify engines
only on the basis of its function or design.' 60 Therefore, Congress
effectively enjoined the EPA from classifying marine vessels by flag for
the purpose of adopting regulations.'
61
Though no exception is made for foreign ships under section 213,
exceptions do appear in other parts of the statute that are applicable to
marine vessels. Section 183(f) of the CAA, also adopted in 1990,
requires that the EPA "promulgate standards applicable to the emission
155. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994).
156. In 1965, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act was signed into law.
Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965). The law authorized the then existing
Department of Health, Education and Welfare to establish the first auto emissions
standards. Id. Congress built upon this initiative by passing the Clean Air Act in 1970,
and amending it in 1977 and 1990. S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 3-4 (1989).
157. See S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 103-04 (1989) (explaining that "major reductions
from uncontrolled emissions levels have been achieved by both cars and, more recently,
by heavy duty trucks and buses" and that non-road engines will be regulated because
they "now make up a significant portion of pollution, especially in urban areas.").
158. S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 103 (1994).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (1995).
160. S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 104-05 (1989).
161. In the regulatory scheme promulgated in 1999, the EPA exempted foreign
ships by declining to regulate all large sea going vessels. If the EPA were to determine
that the pollution emissions from large sea going vessels as a category were not
significant enough to endanger the public, then the deferral would be warranted;
however, the EPA found to the contrary. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From
New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines At or Above 37 kW, 64 Fed. Reg. at 73323.
of VOCs and any other air pollutant from loading and unloading of tank
vessels." 162 The statute provides that "to the extent practicable such
standards shall apply to loading and unloading facilities and not to tank
vessels.' ' 163 The House Report states that Congress intended this clause
"to minimize problems that might be created by subjecting vessels to
inconsistent requirements at different ports."'' 64
That these statements represent an exception for foreign vessels is not
obvious. First of all, "different ports" must refer to ports other than
domestic ports because section 183(f), as a federal statute, applies in all
domestic ports. If the vessels impacted by section 183(f) only traveled
among domestic ports there would be no need to mitigate the impact of
"inconsistent requirements at different ports." However, such mitigation
is needed because the vessels impacted, i.e. tanker vessels, do visit
foreign ports, which may have inconsistent requirements. Congress
ordered that the EPA draft regulations that place the majority of the
burden of controlling emissions from the loading and unloading of tank
vessels upon the ports in order to protect these tanker vessels, many of
which sail under foreign flags, from suffering under the burden of
having to satisfy the requirements of both domestic and foreign ports.
Thus, Section 183(f) makes an implicit exception for foreign flagged
vessels.
This exception is similar to the Panama Canal exception that the Court
relied upon in Cunard. 65 Because Congress did not express this same
concern about "inconsistent requirements" in connection with Section
213, where the language authorizes the EPA to regulate any class of
engines that contributes to air pollution (including foreign vessels), it
must be that Congress intended section 213 to apply to both foreign and
domestic vessels.
162. § 183(0,42 U.S.C. § 751lb(f)(I)(A) (1995).
163. Id.
164. H.R. Rep. No. 101-490(I), at 254-55 (1990).
165. Though not every vessel sailing through the Panama Canal was under a foreign
flag, the Court still found the Panama Canal exception a specific exception for foreign
vessels. Section 183(f) is no less an exception for foreign vessels.
166. Furthermore, even section 183(f), though couched in language meant to
minimize its regulatory impact on tank vessels (both foreign and domestic), nevertheless
explicitly permits foreign vessels to be subject to some amount of regulation, e.g., when
it would not be practicable to do otherwise. § 183(f), 42 U.S.C. § 751 lb(f) (1995). The
EPA subsequently interpreted this to mean that tank vessels could be required to retrofit
their terminal interface technology. The EPA implemented these provisions in 1995.
Rules and Regulations: Federal Standards for Marine Tank Vessel Loading Operations
and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Marine Tank Vessel
Loading Operations, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,388, 48,390 (Sept. 19, 1995) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63). The EPA placed the burden of adopting emissions controls upon the
loading and unloading terminals. Id. at 48,390. The EPA emphasized, however, that
tank vessel owners must bear the cost of retrofitting their vessels to interface effectively
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The CAA is like Cunard in another sense. Exempting foreign vessels
from section 213 would undermine the effectiveness of the CAA in
much the same way that exempting foreign vessels from the NPA would
have undermined that Act.167 A foreign vessel exemption to section 213
would enable domestic vessels to avoid compliance by opting to register
under a foreign flag of convenience. 168 This would allow a whole class
of mobile sources to go unregulated even though they contribute to non-
attainment. Additionally, this would preclude coastal states like California or
Texas from attaining compliance with NAAQS for ozone or CO and
achieving the goal of "rotect[ing] and enhanc[ing] the quality of the
Nation's air resources.
Intertwined with this reasoning is the argument that applying section
213 to foreign vessels is also justified under the principles of Wildenhus.'7°
As the reasoning above illustrates, exempting foreign vessels would
place a disproportionately excessive and destabilizing regulatory burden
upon land-based sources. Congress acknowledged this problem in its
comments to section 328 of the CAA, which regulates the emissions of
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) activities.171 The Senate found that air
pollution generated by OCS sources "is causing or contributing to the
violation of federal and state ambient air quality standards."1 72 Thus, the
Senate reasoned that allowing the pollution emissions of OCS activities
to continue unregulated would make the attainment of NAAQS impossible
without "great cost" to onshore industry and "substantial disruption" of
coastal lifestyles.173 Congress authorized the EPA to regulate marine
with the emissions technology that terminals must install. Id. For an explanation of the
rational behind this arrangement, see Proposed Rules: Federal Standards for Marine
Tank Vessel Loading and Unloading Operations and National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Marine Tank Vessel Loading and Unloading Operations, 59
Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,009 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (proposed May 13, 1994)
(citing cost-effectiveness and the statutory requirement that the regulation of tank vessels
under the statute be minimized).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 140-45.
168. See William Tetley, The Law of the Flag, "Flag Shopping," and Choice of
Law, 17 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 173 (1993).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994). See supra notes 1-4.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (1995). Outer continental sources "include any equipment
activity, or facility which, (i) emits or has the potential to emit any air pollutant, (ii) is
regulated or authorized under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act [43 U.S.C.A. §
1331 et seq.], and (iii) is located on the Outer Continental Shelf. § 7627(4)(C)(i)-(iii).
172. S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 77 (1989).
173. Id.
vessels and other non-road sources for the same reason. 74 This kind of
disruption, which the Court relied upon in Wildenhus, justifies applying
domestic statutes regardless of international law.
175
D. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
As a general principle, the courts will presume that Congress did not
intend a federal statute to apply outside the territory of the United
States. 76 However, courts have not applied this presumption when an
agency has applied a statute extraterritorially to prevent a negative
domestic impact caused by conduct occurring outside the country. 177
Courts have found that negative domestic effects are enough to bring
regulated conduct within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Dodge outlines the extensive case law which supports this proposition. 178
1. The Case Law
In Aramco, the plaintiff claimed that his employment in Saudi Arabia
was terminated in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 79 The court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality
and held that the statute did not apply in Saudi Arabia because it made
no clear expression that it should apply in foreign countries. 80 Before
applying the presumption, however, the Court highlighted the "domestic
effects" exception to the extraterritorial presumption by distinguishing
the Court's holding in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., which applied a
statute extraterritorially.18 ' The court reasoned that the alleged
174. Congress found that OCS pollution was hindering efforts to comply with
NAAQS and on this basis directed EPA to regulate it. S. Rep. 10 1-228, at 76-78 (1989).
In the case of non-road engines, Congress merely found that "emissions from off-road
and non-road engines and vehicles now make up a significant portion of pollution,
especially in urban areas," Id. at 104, but left to the EPA the task of determining whether
emissions pollution from non-road engines was hindering the attainment of NAAQS for
ozone and CO. 42 U.S.C. § 7547(2) (1995). Only upon making this determination could
the EPA regulate a class of non-road engines. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying
text.
175. It is also the kind of disruption that the European Union Study argues justifies
regulating foreign vessels in EU waters. See European Union Study, supra note 6, at 45.
176. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); William S.
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 Berkeley J. Int'l
L. 85, 85 (1998).
177. See Dodge, supra note 176, at 94, 98 & 104-10.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 247
180. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259.
181. Id. at 252 (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952)). In
Bulova, the Court allowed Bulova Watch Co. to sue Steele for trademark infringement
under the Langham Act even though the alleged misconduct occurred in Mexico because
I) the statute applied broadly, and 2) the statute was being applied to conduct which
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misconduct in Aramco did not hurt the United States domestically as did
the conduct in Steele. 182
This exception was implicitly invoked in Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
v. California.183 In Hartford, the Court applied the Sherman Antitrust
Act to an insurance conspiracy in London even though the conduct
occurred entirely outside of the United States.184 While the Court did
not even mention the presumption against extraterritoriality, it
nevertheless concluded that the "Sherman Act applies to foreign
Conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States."' 85 As Dodge argues, the Court's
decision not to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality very
clearly turns on the Court's conclusion that the alleged conspiracy had a
negative impact on the United States. 86  A split exists among the
districts over whether Hartford establishes an "effects" exception to the
presumption against territoriality. 187 However, only the Ninth Circuit
rejects the proposition that "effects" alone are a basis for skipping the
presumption against territoriality.1 88 Of course, there must be some
basis in the language of the statute that gives it a character of broad
application,' 89 but as the Court stated in Aramco, such "boiler plate
language" is insufficient to support the conclusion that the presumption
does not apply. 9°
When the presumption applies, the general consensus is that affirmative
evidence of Congressional intent that the statute be applied extraterritorially,
derived from the statute and legislative history, is sufficient to overcome
the presumption.' 9' Since Aramco, the court has stepped back from the
clear expression standard that Justice Rhenquist applied there. 192 The
lower courts are in agreement on this point.' 9S
caused adverse impacts within the United States. Id.
182. id.
183. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
184. Dodge, supra note 176, at 98.
185. Id. (quoting Hartford, 509 U.S. at 795-96).
186. Id. at 98-100.
187. Id. at 101-10.
188. See id. at 105-07.
189. The court expressly relied upon the broad language of the Langham Act in
Steele. 344 U.S. at 256.
190. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 251; Dodge, supra note 176, at 99 (citing Hartford, 509
U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
191. Dodge, supra note 176, at 110-1I.
192. Id. at 96 (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201-03 & n.4 (1993)).
193. Id. at 111.
2. CAA and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Applying the CAA in the contiguous zone and the EEZ implicates the
case law on the presumption against extraterritoriality because neither
the contiguous zone nor the EEZ are part of the territory of the United
States.194 While UNCLOS 1982 does grant states a limited measure of
jurisdiction in the contiguous zone and the EEZ, states may not assert
the full sovereignty over these zones that they are given over the
territorial sea.195 Thus, whenever an agency interprets a statute so that it
applies to these zones, the court will examine the statute to determine
whether it manifests congressional intent that it apply extraterritorially,
unless of course the statute's application falls within the "domestic
effects" exception. 1
96
The "domestic effects" exception can be invoked to insulate the
application of the CAA to both the contiguous zone and the EEZ. As
previously mentioned, application of the CAA in the contiguous zone
can only be justified on the rational that vessel emissions in the
contiguous zone pose a health risk to the coastal state's population.
97
This health risk constitutes a "domestic effect" which under Hartford98
should exempt the application of the CAA in the contiguous zone from
the purview of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Application of the CAA to foreign vessels in the EZZ can be justified
on one of two rationales. 99 If it is justified on the theory that vessel
emissions in the EEZ affect the marine environment of the territorial sea
by drifting inland, this negative impact would probably qualify as a
negative "domestic effect" sufficient to exempt application of the CAA
in the EEZ from the presumption against extraterritoriality. If it is
justified on the alternate theory that vessel emissions threaten to destroy
the fisheries of the EEZ, application of the CAA in the EEZ would
probably not fall within the "domestic effects" exception because this
impact is felt only in the EEZ and not on the mainland United States.
Whether application of the CAA to the EEZ would survive application
of the presumption against territoriality is unclear. On the one hand, the
CAA does not refer to the EEZ. As previously noted, the CAA does
shoulder the broad purpose of "protect[ing] and enhanc[ing] the quality
of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and
194. See UNCLOS 1982, art. 2, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 400.
195. Id.
196. See discussion, supra Part III.D. 1.
197. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
199. See discussion, supra Part 1II.B.3.
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welfare and the productive capacity of its population. 20 ° Protecting the
fisheries of the EEZ obviously does not fall within this broad scope.
However, protecting coastal air resources from air pollution that drifts in
shore from the EEZ does fall within the scope of this purpose. The
courts have consistently held that such "boiler plate language" is not
sufficient to justify the extraterritorial application of a statute.2 1
Something more is needed, and it is not clear that the evidence of
Congressional intent marshaled in the previous sections manifests
sufficient Congressional intent to support a court in upholding any
application of the CAA to vessels traveling in the EEZ.
IV. COMPARISON WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION STUDY
It is useful to compare the results of this study with one performed by
the European Union.20 2 Motivated by an interest in reducing acid rain
caused by SOx emissions, the European Union Study argues for adopting low
sulfur fuel standards and incentive schemes to induce compliance in the
territorial waters of the nations of the European Union.20 3 The present
study considers only the applicability of NOx emissions regulations that
pertain more to engine design than fuel content because engine design
standards are the only standards which the CAA requires the EPA to
adopt.2°  Unlike this study, the EU study did not consider whether such
regulation could be applied in the contiguous zone and decidedly rejected the
200. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(l) (1994).
201. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
202. European Union Study, supra note 6, at 49-52.
203. Id. at 50.
204. The CAA does authorize the EPA to regulate the marine fuels. The CAA
grants the EPA discretionary authority to regulate the fuel used by non-road vehicles and
engines if the fuel produces emissions which may be "reasonably anticipated to endanger
public health and welfare" or if it significantly impairs the operation of emissions control
devices in general use. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (1994). Such decisions must be based
upon the "consideration of all relevant medical and scientific evidence available to [the
Administrator]. See id. § 7545(c)(2). In addition, the first case must be supported by a
feasibility study of alternative approaches, and the second case must be supported by
cost benefit analysis. Id. Furthermore, states may adopt fee schemes applicable to their
ports as part of their State Implementation Plans. In 1994, the EPA proposed for final
approval Federal Implementation plans covering Sacramento and Ventura counties.
Approval and Promulgation of State and Federal Implementation Plans; California, 59
Fed. Reg. 23,264 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 & 81) (proposed May 5, 1994). In
these plans the EPA declined to regulate the emissions of large sea-going vessels, but
proposed instead a fee structure that would give an incentive to shippers to adopt certain
emission reducing practices. Approval and Promulgation of State and Federal
Implementation Plans; California, 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,378.
option of applying such regulation within the EEZ as authorized by
UNCLOS 1982.05 The basic conclusion of the study is that "[p]rescription
of rules and regulations should be restricted to territorial waters, and
enforcement should generally take place in port." 20 6 Generally, the
European Union Study takes a much more cautious approach to the
issue.
V. CONCLUSIONS
There is a strong basis for applying the regulatory mandates of the
CAA to foreign vessels in the internal waters, territorial sea, and
contiguous zone. Even if regulations of the CAA would be found to
violate Article 21(2) of UNCLOS 1982, such regulation can nevertheless
pass muster with the Supreme Court consistent with the Court's holdings
on the internal affairs rule. The argument for applying it in the EEZ is
much weaker not only because such application is not directly
authorized by UNCLOS 1982, but also because there seems to be
insufficient evidence that Congress intended that the CAA apply in the
EEZ to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. It is
advisable that the United States adopt standards at least as stringent as
those drafted in Annex VI by the IMO to regulate all foreign and
domestic vessels entering the contiguous zone, territorial sea and internal
waters of the United States.
DAN LICKEL
205. European Union Study, supra note 5, at 15.
206. Id. at 50.
